UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-18-2014

State v. Petersen Respondent's Brief 3 Dckt. 39643

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Petersen Respondent's Brief 3 Dckt. 39643" (2014). Not Reported. 732.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/732

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

FILED .. COPY

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

FEB 18 2014

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)
)

NO. 39643

)

KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2011-4470

V.

)

CONRAD W. PETERSEN,

)

)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
)
___________
)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REVIEW

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Conrad W. Petersen asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Opinion No. 775 (Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2013) (hereinafter,
Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which reversed the district court's order granting
Mr. Petersen's motion to suppress, was in conflict with previous decisions of this Court
and the United States Supreme Court, as well as with its own precedent, in that it
authorized a warrantless search based on what the officer admitted to be an
unparticularized suspicion.

1

Assuming review is granted, Mr. Petersen requests that this Court affirm the
district court's order suppressing the evidence found in the passenger compartment of
his car as fruit of an illegal search. Mr. Petersen claims that the district court's order
can be affirmed on two different bases:

first, as the district court determined, the

officers did not have probable cause to search the passenger compartment; and
second, the officers impermissibly extended the traffic stop.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Petersen was driving through northern Idaho on 1-90, heading toward Seattle,
where he intended to visit a friend and potentially purchase a motor home. (R., p.203.)
He had recently purchased his car in Montana and was displaying the appropriate
temporary registration from the rear of his vehicle, as required by Montana law.
(R., pp.206-07.)

Officer Joel Gorham and Officer Jerry Moffett were working an

"interdiction" patrol along Mr. Petersen's route, meaning they were stopping vehicles on
the interstate, just "looking for criminals."

(Tr., Vol.2, p.32, Ls.3-14.) 1

When

Mr. Petersen drove past them, they noticed he was not displaying a front license plate,
and so decided to pull him over. (Tr., Vol.1, p.4, Ls.9-20.)
While the officers were still 120 yards behind Mr. Petersen, and based on what
they admitted was a "pretty rudimentary" observation and calculation, they saw what
they described as an improper signal and an unsafe merge as Mr. Petersen passed a

The transcripts in this case were provided in two separate electronic PDF files.
To promote clarity, "Vol.1" will refer to the file containing the transcript from the
preliminary hearing, which was provided in the electronic file "Exhibits." "Vol.2" will refer
to the transcript from the hearing of Mr. Petersen's motions to suppress and dismiss,
which was provided in the electronic file "09-15-11 Motion, 11-19-11 Motion, 12-22-11
Motion." Page references in both cases will refer to the number appearing on the
transcript page, rather than the PDF page designation.
1
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semi-truck. (Tr., Vol.2, p.14, L.14 - p.16, L.5.) The officers activated their emergency
lights in order to pull Mr. Petersen over. (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.3-8.) As they approached
Mr. Petersen's car, they were able to see the temporary Montana registration, which
was visible from a safe following distance. 2 (Tr., Vol.2, p.35, Ls.1-4.)

Mr. Petersen

yielded appropriately, although he was close enough to the right lane of travel so as to
concern Officer Gorham with the safety of approaching the vehicle on the driver's side.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.20, Ls.5-9 (Officer Gorham testifying that Mr. Petersen had stopped
"sufficiently on the shoulder of the road"); Tr., Vol.2, p.60, L.22 - p.61, L.5 (Officer
Gorham discussing his safety concern with the position of Mr. Peterson's vehicle
vis-a-vis the right lane of travel).) The officers left the emergency lights on their vehicle
activated throughoutthe duration of the stop. (R., p.217.)
Officer Gorham asked Mr. Petersen for his license and registration, which
Mr. Petersen provided. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.11-14.) The officer saw the following items
in Mr. Petersen's car: a partially-empty twelve pack of Diet Pepsi, an air freshener, two
cellular phones, a pair of jeans, and some miscellaneous documents. (Tr., Vol.1, p.8,
Ls.14-20; Tr., Vol.2, p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.17.)

He described the car as "very clean."

(Tr., Vol.2, p.22, L.25.) Mr. Petersen was very friendly, though his hands were shaking.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.17-18; Tr., Vol.2, p.22, Ls.6-8.) Officer Gorham took Mr. Petersen's
identification back to the police vehicle and gave them to Officer Moffett, so Officer
Moffett could perform a records check while Officer Gorham got the citation book and

2

The district court ultimately found that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to
stop Mr. Petersen based on the lack of a front license plate because Mr. Petersen's use
of a temporary registration on the rear of his car comported with Montana law.
(R., pp.206-07.) However, it did find that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the
stop from the observations regarding the allegedly-improper signal and merge.
{R., pp.207-09.)
3

returned to Mr. Petersen's car.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.22-25.)

Officer Gorham had

decided to issue Mr. Petersen a "warning citation," which meant he had decided not to
cite Mr. Petersen for any violation. (Tr., Vol.2, p.41, Ls.10-13.)
While he was writing the warning, Officer Gorham had Mr. Petersen get out of his
car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.19, Ls.24-25.) In speaking with Mr. Petersen, Officer Gorham learned
that Mr. Petersen was going to Seattle to visit a friend. (Tr., Vol.1, p.26, L.24 - p.27,
L.1.)

This information was apparently suspicious to the officer.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.27,

Ls.14-16.) The reason for this, according to Officer Gorham, is that Seattle is "a major
distributor of marijuana" but cities like Boston, New York City, Minneapolis, and
Anchorage are not. 3 (Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.17 - p.28, L.18.) Officer Moffett walked up and
told Officer Gorham that the records check had not revealed any reason to arrest
Mr. Petersen, and he returned Mr. Petersen's license and registration. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24,
Ls.7-10.)

Officer Gorham gave Mr. Petersen the written warning and asked

Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go."4

(Tr., Vol.2, p.70, L.24 - p.71, L.2; R., p.20.)

Mr. Petersen indicated that he was. (R., p.20; Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.15-16.) As a result,
Mr. Petersen shook both officers' hands and turned to leave.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.24,

Ls.10-12.)

This apparently means, according to Officer Gorham, that all vehicles headed to or
from Seattle are suspected to be involved in marijuana trafficking simply because
Seattle is involved in their travel plans. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.27, L.17 - p.29, L.5.)
4 Officer Gorham offered conflicting testimony as to whether he asked Mr. Petersen if he
was "good to go" or whether he told Mr. Petersen that he was "good to go." (Compare
Tr., vol.2, p.70, L.24 - p.71, L.2; and R., p.20 (police report indicating Officer Gorham
asked Mr. Petersen if he was good to go); with Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) The district court
resolved this contradiction, finding, as a matter of fact, that Officer Gorham "asked
Defendant if he was 'good to go."' (R., p.202 (emphasis added).)
3

4

However, Officer Gorham decided that he was not done with his investigation
and, a few seconds later, as Mr. Petersen was walking back to his car, reinitiated the
conversation with Mr. Petersen so as to ask Mr. Petersen more questions. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.50,

L.25 - p.51,

L.9 (Officer Gorham

admitting that he was continuing

his

investigation); Tr., Vol.2, p.77, Ls.5-11 (Officer Gorham testifying as to the time between
his asking Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go" and his extension of the detention).) 5
Officer Gorham also admitted that he was not investigating any crime in particular.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4.) Specifically, Officer Gorham testified that: "I asked
[Mr. Petersen] if he was good to go, in which [sic] he told me he was." (Tr., Vol.1, p.10,
Ls.15-16.) That was consistent with his police report. (R., p.20.) Additionally, Officer
Gorham testified that he was trying to engage in a consensual conversation specifically
to extend the detention without violating the rules about impermissibly extending a
detention. (Tr., Vol.2, p.49, L.9 - p.50, L.2.) Officer Gorham first asked Mr. Petersen
about his travel plans to see if he could get Mr. Petersen to make an inconsistent
statement, and then asked if he could search the trunk of Mr. Petersen's car.
(Tr., Vol.1, p.34, Ls.3-9; Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.25.) Mr. Petersen opened the
trunk for Officer Gorham. 6 (Tr., Vol.2, p.26, Ls.1-3.)

Despite being part of a special task force designed to locate evidence of major crimes,
the officers' vehicle is not equipped with audio or video recording devices. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.44, Ls.5-8.) Therefore, the only record of what Officer Gorham said and how he said
it is the transcript of his testimony.
6 The district court ultimately found that Mr. Petersen had engaged in a consensual
conversation, and therefore, the stop was not illegally extended. (See R., pp.212-17.)
However, it did note that, if the conversation had not been consensual, the officers
would have illegally extended the stop. (R., pp.211-12.) It also found that Mr. Petersen
had voluntarily consented to the search of his trunk. (R., pp.210-17.) Additionally, the
district court determined that the consent to search the trunk implicitly included consent
5

5

Inside the trunk, Officer Gorham found an average-sized duffle bag, which
Mr. Petersen said contained $55,000 in cash. 7 (Tr., Vol.2, p.26, Ls.7-25.) The money
was separated into thousand dollar bundles, with one of the bills and a rubber band
used to secure the bundles. 8 (Tr., Vol.2, p.27, Ls.12-16.) Upon seeing the money and
without

requesting

consent,

Officer

Moffett

began

searching

the

passenger

compartment of Mr. Petersen's vehicle. 9 (See Tr., Vol.2, p.42, Ls.6-11.) While Officer
Moffett began his search, Officer Gorham asked Mr. Petersen various questions about
the money.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.42, Ls.6-11.)

Inside the passenger compartment, Officer

Moffett found a small quantity of marijuana as well as some literature about certain
gardening techniques (specifically, hydroponics), receipts for gardening materials, and
documents relating to the sale and registration of the car. (Tr., Vol.2, p.96, Ls.12-19;

R., pp.36-40.)

Mr. Petersen was placed under arrest for possession of marijuana.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.70, Ls.6-8.)
Mr. Petersen was ultimately charged with four different offenses:

money

laundering, attempted destruction of evidence, misdemeanor possession of marijuana,
and misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia. (R., pp.86-88.) In regard to
the money laundering charge, the State initially alleged several alternative means by

to search all containers therein, absent any indication to the contrary by Mr. Petersen.
~R., p.217.)
When the cash was subsequently counted, it actually totaled approximately
$71,505.00. (R., p.18.) Mr. Petersen had an additional $890.00 in cash on his person.
~R., p.18; Tr., Vol.1, p.52, Ls.21-25.)
Officer Gorham testified that he encounters people carrying thousands of dollars in
cash "all the time" and those other people did not secure their money in this particular
fashion. (Tr., Vol.1, p.12, Ls.17-20.) Rather, Officer Gorham testified that this was
more consistent with money carried by people involved in narcotics trafficking. (See
Tr., Vol.2, p.79, Ls.5-24.)
9 Officer Gorham admitted that Mr. Petersen was never asked for his consent to search
any part of the vehicle except the trunk. (Tr., Vol.2, p.52, L.20 - p.53, L.7.)
6

which Mr. Petersen committed that offense.

(See R., pp.81-82.)

However, the

magistrate court only bound Mr. Petersen over on a single theory. (Tr., Vol.1, p.104,
Ls.5-23; see also R., pp.220-21.)

Specifically, it found probable cause to believe

Mr. Petersen had violated I.C. § 18-8201(1) by transporting money he knew was used
to further a pattern of racketeering, and that pattern of racketeering was evidenced by
violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. 10 (Tr., Vol.1, p.104, Ls.5-23; see also

R., pp.220-21.)
Mr. Petersen filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in his car as the fruit
of an illegal search, and a motion to dismiss the information as unsupported by probable
cause.

(R., pp.98-99, 131-48.) As to the motion to suppress, Mr. Petersen alleged

several reasons why the officers' search was illegal:

they did not have reasonable

suspicion to pull him over, they impermissibly extended the detention, the consent to
search the trunk was not voluntarily given, the search exceeded the scope of
the consent, and there was no probable cause to justify a warrantless search.

(R., pp.106-29, 196-97.) In regard to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Petersen challenged
the money laundering charge as being overbroad and unspecific in its allegations,
noting that it did not allege a specific act (much less the two specific acts required by
the money laundering statute) by which Mr. Petersen had violated chapter 27, title 37,
Idaho Code, in a pattern of racketeering, and thereby committed the offense of money
laundering. (R., p.135.) Alternatively, he argued that even if such acts were alleged, no
such acts were alleged to have occurred in Idaho and, therefore, there was no proof on
a material element of the offense, requiring dismissal of the charge. (R., pp.136-39.)

°Chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code, is the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.

1
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The district court held a hearing on Mr. Petersen's motions.

The prosecutor

made no arguments on the record at the hearing. (See generally Tr., Vol.2.) While
there was a subsequent brief filed by the defendant, no brief from the State appears in
the record in that regard. 11 (R., pp.191-98; see generally R.)
The district court ultimately concluded that the items in the passenger
compartment of Mr. Petersen's car which were observed by Officer Gorham did not
support a particularized suspicion of anything, but rather, merely gave rise to a hunch.
(R., p.211.) Therefore, even when considered with the cash found in the trunk of the
car, the district court found they did not amount to probable cause in the totality of the
circumstances to search the passenger compartment. (R., pp.218-19.) Additionally, it
found that the scope of Mr. Petersen's consent did not extend to the passenger
compartment.

(R., p.219.)

Therefore, the district court suppressed all the evidence

found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle (i.e., the marijuana, the
paraphernalia, and the documents) as the fruit of an illegal, warrantless search.
(R., p.219.)

In regard to the motion to dismiss, the district court found that Mr. Petersen had
only been bound over on the theory that he had committed money laundering by
transporting money he knew to be related to a pattern of racketeering evidenced by
violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code. (R., pp.220-21.) The district court also

found that the Information impermissibly alleged alternative means of committing the

11

In fact, the only brief from the State which does appear in the record addresses
Mr. Petersen's subsequent arguments on the attempted destruction of evidence
charge. (R., pp.253-57.) The State made no arguments on appeal in that regard. (See
generally App. Br.)

8

offense for which Mr. Petersen was not bound over.

(R., pp.220-21.)

Therefore, it

struck those portions of the Information which were improperly alleged. (R., p.221.)
As to the theory under which Mr. Petersen had been bound over, the district
court found that the information sufficiently alleged a factual basis for the offense so that
Mr. Petersen was properly put on notice. (R., pp.222-23.) However, it found that no
evidence had been proffered by the State as to one of the material elements of that
offense - that Mr. Petersen knew or intended the money to be used to further a pattern
of racketeering, evidenced by violations of chapter 27, title 37, Idaho Code.
(R., pp.224-25.) Specifically, the district court noted that the State did not allege any

acts occurring in Idaho which demonstrated such a pattern of violations of chapter 27,
title 37. (See R., p.224.) The closest the State had come to meeting that burden was
speculating that Mr. Petersen might, at some point in the future, use that money to
purchase a controlled substance and then might possibly return to Idaho, thereby
potentially violating chapter 27, title 37 Idaho Code. That, the district court held, was
insufficient to meet the State's burden. (R., p.224.) Therefore, because the State had
failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe that Mr. Petersen had committed
money laundering, the district court dismissed that charge. (R., pp.224-25.)
The State appealed from the order suppressing the evidence from the passenger
compartment and the order dismissing the money laundering charge, challenging the
district court's conclusions on both issues.

(Order Granting Motion to Augment the

Record, dated June 3, 2013 (augmenting the record with a copy of the notice of
appeal).) Specifically, it challenged the district court's determination that there was no
probable cause to justify the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of

9

Mr. Petersen's car pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 12
(App. Br., pp.5-9.)

It also challenged the district court's finding that there was no

probable cause showing made in regard to all the material elements of the money
laundering charge, and so challenged the district court's dismissal of that charge.
(App. Br., pp.9-13.)

The State subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal,

conceding that its challenge to the decision to dismiss the money laundering charge
was not filed from an appealable order. (Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Statement in
Support Thereof, dated October 16, 2013.) This Court granted that motion on the basis
that it "appears that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction as to that issue" and
dismissed the appellate challenge as to the order dismissing the money laundering
charge. (Order Dismissing Appeal In Part, dated October 22, 2013.)
Mr. Petersen's response to the remaining issue was two-fold. First, he argued
that the district court's decision to suppress the evidence found in the passenger
compartment was correct because officers did not possess, by their own admission, the
necessary particularized suspicion to engage in the warrantless search of the
passenger compartment. (Resp. Br., pp.15-20.) He also argued, in the alternative, the
appellate court could affirm that decision under the rationale of "right result, wrong
reason" because the officers illegally prolonged the traffic stop. 13 (Resp. Br., pp.20-27.)

12

In making this argument, the State presumed that the search of the trunk was valid
and the money found therein could be considered in the probable cause determination.
(App. Br., pp.5-9.) As will be explained infra, Mr. Petersen does not believe that is the
case.
13 That issue had been litigated as part of the suppression motion, and the district court
had determined that the officers did not illegally prolong the stop.
As such,
Mr. Petersen contended that the district court's conclusion in that regard was erroneous,
but that the appellate court could still affirm its ultimate conclusion in that regard.
10

The Court of Appeals agreed that none of the facts upon which the officers relied
to search the passenger compartment of the vehicle were criminal in nature. (Opinion,
p.9.) Nevertheless, it reversed the district court's decision based on its determination
that all the facts together still "provided a substantial chance or probability that a search
of [Mr.] Petersen's vehicle would yield evidence of criminal activity involving cash or
drugs."

(Opinion, p.9.)

Mr. Petersen filed a timely petition for review following the

issuance of that opinion.

11

ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Petersen's Judgment
of Conviction is in conflict with previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Idaho Court of Appeals, in that the
decision allows a warrantless search based on an unparticularized suspicion.

2.

Whether the district court's order suppressing the evidence should be affirmed
because the officers engaged in an illegal search of Mr. Petersen's car.

12

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming Mr. Petersen's Judgment Of Conviction
Is In Conflict With Previous Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court, The Idaho
Supreme Court, And The Idaho Court Of Appeals, In That The Decision Allows A
Warrantless Search Based On An Unparticularized Suspicion

A

Introduction
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted

only "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered.
Rule 118(b) provides a non-exhaustive list of five factors which must be considered in
evaluating any petition for review:
1)

Whether the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court;

2)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court;

3)

Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior
decisions;

4)

Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the
Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority; and,

5)

Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further
appellate review is desirable.

I.AR. 11 S(b). In this case, Mr. Petersen contends that there are special and important
reasons for review to be granted because the Court of Appeals' decision is in
contravention of United States Supreme Court, Idaho Supreme Court, and Idaho Court

13

of Appeals precedent.

I.A.R. 118(b)(2)-(3). Therefore, this Court should exercise its

review authority in this case.
B.

The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Improperly Allows Warrantless Searches Based
On An Officer's Hunch
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho

516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CONST. Art. I,§ 17; State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469, 471 (2001).
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a
warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment. The State can only
overcome that presumption by demonstrating that one of the exceptional, wellestablished, and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable to
the facts. Id. at 390-91; see a/so State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding
the same standard applies to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution).
One of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile
exception, which allows police officers to search a vehicle when they have "probable
cause to

believe the vehicle

contains contraband

or evidence of a crime."

State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012); see a/so United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 805 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).

14

According to this Court, probable cause is established "when the totality of the
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise-in the
mind of a reasonable person-to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime would be found in a particular place." Id. Probable cause does not arise when
the officer possesses only a hunch or an unparticularized suspicion of criminal activity.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 59 (Ct. App.
2011). In order to be a "particularized" suspicion, the officer's suspicion must satisfy
two elements: (1) it must be based on the totality of the circumstances, and (2) it must
yield a reasonable suspicion that the particular person is engaged in a criminal activity.
State v. Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). Specificity in this regard is a core
requirement of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 n.18; United

States v. Cortez, 499 U.S. 411,418 (1981). As such, where there is a lack of evidence
to show any specific criminal activity (i.e., where "the evidence available to the officers
prior to the unlawful search did not implicate any specific criminal activity"), the officers
do not have a particularized suspicion.

State v. Newman, 149 Idaho 596, 600

(Ct. App. 2010) (interpreting State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 (Ct. App. 2006))
(emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case ignores the requirement that the
suspicion be particularized in order to amount to probable cause. Just as the officers
conceded that they did not know what criminal activity they were investigating, 14 the

14

Q. What crime did you reasonably suppose he was engaged in?

A. I'm not sure. That's why I asked for consent to search the vehicle to
find possible evidence of that crime. And criminal indicators could be any
crime throughout the spectrum. People are going to show indicators,
15

Court of Appeals' opinion could not say what particular criminal activity these factors
indicated: the evidence "provided a substantial chance or probability that a search of
[Mr.] Petersen's vehicle would yield evidence of criminal activity involving cash or

drugs." (Opinion, p.9 (emphasis added).) That decision does not hold the State to its
burden to show there was evidence of specific criminal activity, a requirement that has
been established and repeatedly upheld by the United States Supreme Court, this
Court, and the Court of Appeals itself. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22; Anderson, 154 Idaho at
706; Newman, 149 Idaho at 600; Swindle, 148 Idaho at 64; Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915.
This Opinion allows a warrantless search in a scenario which constitutes the definition
of a hunch: the officer, looking at facts which even the Court of Appeals admits were
not criminal in nature, had a hunch Mr. Petersen might be engaged in some sort of
unspecified criminal activity. Compare Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
In fact, when considering a case with similar facts, all of which, independently,
did not have a suspicious nature, the Court of Appeals had held "[t]hese facts alone,

although they could be viewed in a suspicious light, do not support a commonsense
evaluation that there was a fair probability that contraband existed in the home. To the

whether they are murderers, whether they had child porn inside the
vehicle, drugs, money. Who knows? ...
Q. So you had a suspicion he had committed or [was] about to commit a
crime, but you don't know what crime?

A. Correct.
Q. So, it could have been anything, reckless driving to terrorism?

A. Could be.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4 (emphasis added).)
16

contrary, this minimal evidence does not directly contradict [the defendants'] explanation
for the fire and does not implicate any specific criminal activity." Bunting, 142 Idaho at
915.

This holding is equally applicable to Mr. Petersen's case:

he provided an

explanation for all the facts that the officers were concerned about, and although they
could potentially be viewed in a suspicious light, did not implicate any specific criminal
activity. As such, this decision is also clearly contradictory to the Court of Appeals' own

precedent. Therefore, this Court should exercise its review authority in this case.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case demonstrates the latest
step in a disturbing trend where the Court of Appeals has moved toward allowing
warrantless searches based solely on the officer's testimony that he was suspicious.
Compare State v. Schwartz, 133 Idaho 463, 467 (1999) (holding that the test is an

objective one; the officer's subjective belief as to whether he had probable cause is not
relevant). The Opinion in this case was issued a few weeks after the Court of Appeals'
opinion in State v. Mathews, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 754 (Ct. App. Nov. 19,
2013). 15 The facts upon which the officers relied in that case to formulate the basis for
their "probable cause" mirror those relied upon in this case, though on the opposite end
of the spectrum. 16

In Mathews, the suspicious factors were the suspect's calm

Given the similarity of the facts at issue, as well as the irreconcilable nature of the
Court of Appeals' analysis in each case, Mr. Petersen and Mr. Mathews filed a joint
motion to consolidate their cases for purposes of review. (Motion to Consolidate and to
Suspsend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed December 17,
2013.) This Court denied that motion without explanation. (Order Denying Motion to
Consolidate Appeals and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated January 15, 2014.)
16 In both cases, the Court of Appeals decided that certain factors articulated by the
officers added no weight to the determination of probable cause and so did not consider
them. In Mr. Petersen's case, it was the presence of sodas and jeans in his car.
(Opinion, p.8 n.3.) In Mathews, it was the presence of energy drinks and food
wrappers. Mathews, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 754, p.5. The fact that the officers
15

17

demeanor and eye contact with the officer, his circuitous travel route, and his lack of an
explanation for his travel plans. Id. pp.5-7. In this case, the suspicious factors were
Mr. Petersen's nervous behavior and his explanation of his travel plans along a direct
travel route (going to buy a motor home with cash, per his personal preference for such
transactions, given his career in used car sales, and to visit a friend in Seattle).
(Opinion, pp.8-9.) In both cases, those facts were sufficient, according to the Court
of Appeals, to give rise to probable cause, so as to justify warrantless search of
Mr. Petersen's vehicle, or to give rise to reasonable suspicion, so as to justify the
prolonged detention in Mathews.
The result of the Court of Appeals' recent decisions is that, no matter how a
person travels on Idaho's roads or interacts with its law enforcement officers, that
person is behaving suspiciously and the officers can disregard that person's
constitutional rights and warrantlessly search his car. For example, if he is nervous,
that is suspicious behavior, but if he is not nervous, that is also suspicious. Compare
Mathews, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 754, 5-7; with Petersen, 2013 Opinion No.

775, 8-9. If he takes the interstate directly toward his destination, that is suspicious,
while, if he chooses to travel Idaho's scenic highways, that is also suspicious, because
in either case, he might possibly be part of a drug operation. Id.

Such holdings allow

the exception to swallow the rule, and is directly contrary to clear and unanimous United
States Supreme Court precedent: "it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se

were relying in part on such "minimally-relevant" factors further demonstrates that the
officers did not have a particularized suspicion, but rather, were trying to justify a search
based on a hunch.
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unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and

exceptions."' Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390 (quoting Katz v.

United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals'
decision does not promote application of a "well-delineated" exception; it broadens the
exception to effectively all traffic stops. As such, it promotes a presumption that the
warrantless search is reasonable, rather than adhering to the rule that such a
warrantless intrusion is per se unreasonable. Since the Court of Appeals' Opinion is in
direct conflict with the controlling precedent, this Court should grant review in this case
to remedy that error.

11.
The District Court's Order Suppressing The Evidence Should Be Affirmed Because The
Officers Engaged In An Illegal Search Of Mr. Petersen's Car
A.

Introduction
The district court properly found that the officers lacked probable cause to

conduct a search of Mr. Petersen's car pursuant to the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement.

The information the officers highlighted did no more than give

them, by their own admission, an unparticularized hunch.

Warrantless invasions of

privacy are not permitted when officers merely have hunches of criminal activity.
Alternatively, this Court should affirm the district court's decision because the
officers impermissibly extended the detention, as no reasonable person would have felt
free to leave when, after turning to leave, has an officer reengage him in a conversation
and that officer is repeating the same questions that he has already answered,
particularly when he is on the side of an interstate highway, close enough to the lane of

19

travel to raise safety concerns, and the emergency lights on the officer's vehicle are still
activated. 17
B.

The District Court Properly Suppressed The Evidence Found In The Passenger
Compartment Of Mr. Petersen's Car When It Determined That The Officers'
Search Of That Car Was Not Justified By The Automobile Exception Because
The Officers Did Not Have Probable Cause To Suspect Any Criminal Activity
The State argues that the district court's finding that the automobile exception did

not justify the warrantless search of the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's
vehicle was in error because it believes the officers had probable cause from the
"criminal indicators" identified by the officers, when considered alongside the cash found
in the trunk. (App. Br., pp.5-9.) The State is mistaken because those factors do not
constitute probable cause; at best, they give rise to a hunch.
In Bunting, the only evidence that could properly be considered in assessing
whether there was probable cause for a search was not sufficiently particularized to
justify the search. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 386. That was because the information
considered was all of a non-criminal nature and, even though that information "could be
viewed in a suspicious light," it did not reasonably demonstrate the probability of any
particular crime would be found during a subsequent search. See id.; Newman, 149
Idaho at 600.

Therefore, where facts articulated by officers do not reasonably suggest

If this Court affirms the decision to suppress the fruit of the illegal search on the
alternative ground, then the officers' search of the trunk of Mr. Petersen's car
constituted a warrantless search without a justifying exception present. As a result, the
cash should also be suppressed, and thus, could not be considered in the totality of
circumstances to determine whether probable cause existed for the search of the
passenger compartment. That would leave only the "criminal indicators" to be weighed
in that regard, and they only generate a hunch at most. Therefore, the district court's
order to suppress the evidence found in the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's
car should be affirmed on this alternative ground. Athay, 146 Idaho at 415; Curl, 125
Idaho at 227.
17
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any particular criminal activity is afoot, especially where all the facts articulated are not
criminal in nature, they do not form a particularized suspicion of criminal activity upon
which to justify a probable cause search. See id.
The facts known to the officers in regard to Mr. Petersen do not reasonably
suggest that any particular criminal activity was afoot. In fact, Officer Gorham admitted
that, based on the facts of which he was aware before the money in the trunk was
discovered, he did not have a suspicion that any particular criminal activity was afoot:
Q. What were you investigating [when you called Mr. Petersen back after

telling him he was free to leave]?

A. Potential crime.
Q. What crime?

A. I don't know.
Q. What crime did you reasonably suppose he was engaged in?

A. I'm not sure. That's why I asked for consent to search the vehicle to
find possible evidence of that crime. And criminal indicators could be any
crime throughout the spectrum. People are going to show indicators,
whether they are murderers, whether they had child porn inside the
vehicle, drugs, money. Who knows? ...
Q. So you had a suspicion he had committed or [was] about to commit a
crime, but you don't know what crime?

A. Correct.
Q. So, it could have been anything, reckless driving to terrorism?

A. Could be.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4 (emphasis added).) And even after the money was
discovered, all Officer Gorham could say was:

A. We believed we had a crime occurring in our presence.

21

Q.

And that would be the fact he was in possession of the cash or was it

something else?
A. The only charge would be it was the crime I believe he was in commission of

[sic].
(Tr., Vol.2, p.64, Ls.13-18.) With those answers, Officer Gorham admitted that he only
had a hunch of criminal activity, and that his hunch was not particularized in any way,
which means the officers could not have had the necessary probable cause to
search the vehicle. Compare Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915; Newman, 149 Idaho at 600;
see also State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819 (2008) (discussing officers' hunches and
the impropriety of basing searches thereon). Given the non-criminal nature of the items
observed in Mr. Petersen's car, and the low degree of suspicion that those items
generated as a whole, even in the officer's own mind, a reasonable person would not
see probable cause in the totality of these circumstances. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at
915.
Apart from those factors, which could not reasonably generate an articulable
suspicion of criminal activity, there was only one other fact known to Officer Moffett
when he began his search: there was money in the trunk. That too, was a fact of a
non-criminal nature, and was not particularly suspicious.

(See R., pp.218-19.)

Furthermore, Mr. Petersen gave the officers a plausible explanation for legitimately
carrying that amount of cash: he was planning on purchasing a motor home, and, given
his history as a car salesman, he preferred to make such transactions in cash.
(R., p.219.)

Therefore, the district court found the fact that Mr. Petersen had a

legitimate explanation for having the money in his car gave that money a low degree of
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suspiciousness as well, and it determined that, even considering it alongside the other
factors, they were not of a significant weight, and therefore, did not give rise to probable
cause.

(R., pp.218-219.) As such, given the non-criminal nature and low degree of

suspicion attached to all the factors identified by the officers, this Court should affirm the
district court's decision to suppress the evidence found in the passenger compartment
as the fruit of an illegal search. See Bunting, 142 Idaho at 915.
C.

The District Court's Order Suppressing The Evidence Should Also Be Affirmed
Because The Officers lmpermissibly Extended The Duration Of The Stop
Even if this Court would tend to agree with the State that the "criminal indicators"

combined with the money could generate probable cause, it should still affirm the district
court's suppression order on other grounds.

'"Where an order of the lower court is

correct, but based on an erroneous theory, the order will be affirmed upon the correct
theory."' Athay v. Stacey, 146 Idaho 407, 415 (2008) (quoting Andre v. Morrow, 106
Idaho 455, 459 (1984)); see, e.g., State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 227 (1993) (applying
this rule while affirming the lower court's order to suppress evidence found during an
illegal search).

This Court should affirm the order suppressing the evidence found

during the search of Mr. Petersen's vehicle because the officers unreasonably
prolonged their detention of Mr. Petersen.

See, e.g., Curl, 125 Idaho at 227. The

district court determined that the officers did improperly prolong the stop. (R., p.211.)
However, it determined that did not justify suppressing the evidence found in the car
because it also determined that the stop had evolved into a consensual encounter, and
therefore, denied Mr. Petersen's motion on that ground.

(R., p.211.)

Mr. Petersen

contends the district court's conclusion was erroneous, and that the district court's order
suppressing the evidence should be upheld because the stop was illegally prolonged.
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When officers effectuate a traffic stop, the detention of the driver must be based
on reasonable suspicion and "must also be reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56,
59 (Ct. App. 2011 ). The duration of a traffic stop cannot be extended once the purpose
of the stop is completed. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650 (Ct. App. 2002). It is
clear that, "if an officer questions a driver about matters unrelated to the traffic stop after
the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, the questioning, no matter how short, extends
the duration of the stop and is an unwarranted intrusion upon the privacy and liberty of
the vehicle's occupants." State v. Bordeaux, 148 Idaho 1, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). There are
two exceptions to this rule.

First, if the officer observes objective, specific, and

particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of criminal activity, the purpose

of the stop may evolve, allowing the otherwise impermissible extended detention and
investigation.

See, e.g., State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916 (Ct. App. 2001).

A mere hunch or unparticularized suspicion on the part of the officer is insufficient to
trigger this exception. See Swindle, 148 Idaho at 64. Otherwise, the encounter may
evolve into a consensual encounter, but such evolution only occurs when an officer
returns the driver's identification and there is no "further show of authority which would
convey a message that the individual is not free to leave." Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650.
If the encounter does not become consensual and the officer prolongs the detention, the
officer violates the defendant's constitutional rights. Id.; Bordeaux, 148 Idaho at 8.
In this case, as described in Section ll(B), supra, the officers had not observed
objective, specific, and particular facts to give rise to a particularized suspicion of any
specific criminal activity. (See, e.g., R., p.211.) Rather, all they had at the point Officer
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Gorham gave Mr. Petersen the warning citation, and thereby completed the purpose of
the stop, was a hunch that criminal activity was afoot - they did not suspect any
particular criminal activity based on their observations. (R., p.211.) Therefore, because
there were no objective particularized facts to justify a shift in the investigation, the
officer's questions about an issue unrelated to the purpose of the stop, after the purpose
of the stop was completed, extended the stop without justification. 18 See Brumfield, 136
Idaho at 916; Swindle, 148 Idaho at 64. Furthermore, Officer Gorham admitted that he
was continuing his investigation when he asked Mr. Petersen the additional questions
after giving him the warning citation.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.51, Ls.5-9.)

Therefore, Officer

Gorham improperly extended the duration of the stop. See, e.g., Bordeaux, 148 Idaho
at 8; Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650.

As such, the only way that Officer Gorham's

investigation did not violate Mr. Petersen's constitutional right to be free from
warrantless seizures is if the encounter became consensual.
The encounter between Mr. Petersen and the officers did not become
consensual because Officer Gorham made a further show of authority when, as
Mr. Petersen attempted to leave, Officer Gorham reinitiated contact with Mr. Petersen
so as to ask him questions which Mr. Petersen had already answered. That conveyed
the message that Mr. Petersen was not, in fact, free to leave after all. Gutierrez, 137
Idaho at 650. The ultimate conclusion of whether Mr. Petersen was free to leave is not
based on what the officer subjectively intended to do (i.e., engage in a consensual
conversation), but rather, is based on how an objectively reasonable person would feel,

18

The district court actually concluded that, unless the stop had evolved into a
consensual encounter, then the officers would have improperly prolonged the stop.
(R., p.211.)
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based on that reasonable person's interpretation of the officer's statements and actions.
See, e.g., id.; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (holding that a

seizure occurs when the reasonable person would not feel free '"to disregard the police
and go about his business"') (quoting California

v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).

As with the officer's subjective beliefs, the defendant's subjective beliefs about whether
he was free to go are not relevant; the courts must determine if a reasonable person
would feel free to leave. State

v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App. 2011).

However, it is noteworthy that Officer Gorham admitted the only reason he asked
Mr. Petersen if he was "good to go" was to attempt to get around the legal requirement
that he not extend traffic stops without particularized suspicion. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1,
p.10, Ls.15-16; Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) He never actually told Mr. Petersen that he could
leave. 19 (See generally R., Trs.) Officer Gorham stated that, as Mr. Petersen started to
head back to his vehicle, "I started up a consensual conversation with him, a couple
more questions I wanted to ask him and if he wanted to stick around and answer them,
I would like to talk to him." (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.14-17 (emphasis added).) He claimed
that the reason he reinitiated the interrogation was "[m]y reasonable suspicion was
starting to pique.

So as an officer, it was my duty to

... confront him or deny my

suspicion. I asked him a couple of additional question is [sic] one of those ways to do
that."

(Tr., Vol.2, p.46, Ls.4-9.)

However, Officer Gorham admitted that "nothing

19

Officer Gorham testified at the preliminary hearing: "I asked [Mr. Petersen] if he was
good to go, in which [sic] he told me he was." (Tr., Vol.1, p.10, Ls.15-16.) That was
consistent with his police report. (R., p.20.) However, at the hearing on Mr. Petersen's
motions, he testified: "I told him he was good to go." (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, L.10.) The
district court resolved this contradiction, finding, as a matter of fact, that Officer Gorham
"asked Defendant if he was 'good to go."' (R., p.202 (emphasis added).) Idaho's
appellate courts defer to the district court's findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232 (2005).
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increased my suspicion," as nothing about the encounter had changed.

(Tr., Vol.1,

p.47, L.20 - p.49, L.11.) Therefore, a reasonable person, who may have assumed he
was free to leave, would be disabused of that belief by the officer's decision to reinitiate
contact and ask the same questions he had already asked within seconds of an attempt
to leave the scene.

(See Tr., Vol.2, p.77, Ls.1-11.) As such, the reasonable person

would interpret the officer's reinitiation of the encounter as a show of authority that
would convey the message to a reasonable person that Mr. Petersen was not, in fact,
free to leave. See Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 650. Given the totality of the circumstances,
a reasonable person would not have felt free

to get in his car and drive away from

Officer Gorham, and so, despite his attempt to circumvent Mr. Petersen's constitutional
rights, he illegally prolonged the detention of Mr. Petersen.
Additionally, when a person is ordered out of their vehicle pursuant to

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 160, 111 n.6 (1977), it is likely that they "would not
believe that the traffic stop was over until he or she was permitted to return [to their
car]."

Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651.

In this case, Officer Gorham only asked if

Mr. Petersen was good to go; he never actually told Mr. Petersen that he was free to
leave. And while Mr. Petersen may have initially interpreted that question as permission
to return to his car (evidenced by his turning to head toward the car), he was
immediately disabused of that belief when Officer Gorham spoke up after just a few
seconds (Tr., Vol.2, p.77, Ls.5-11), indicating that Mr. Petersen should wait because he
had more questions to ask.

In such situations, this Court has determined that "[t]he

average person may not have felt comfortable driving away at that point, knowing that
the officer wanted to say something."

State v. Ray, 153 Idaho 564, 568 (2012).
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Therefore, a reasonable person in Mr. Petersen's situation would not have felt free to
leave, and thus, the conversation was not consensual.

See Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at

650.
Furthermore, this encounter was taking place on the side of an interstate
highway and the parked cars were close enough to the lanes of travel to give both
officers some concern as to their safety from other vehicles on the road. (See, e.g.,
Tr., Vol.2, p.60, L.19 - p.61, L.5 (Officer Gorham describing his concern).)

In fact,

according to Officer Moffett, "it's a very tight roadway through there and it would be [a]
safety issue for us to turn ou[r] lights off."20 (Tr., Vol.1, p.65, Ls.16-19.) As such, that
particular shoulder of the highway was not a safe place where reasonable people would
stand around and converse. A reasonable person would not remain in such a situation
any longer than need be. Therefore, when Officer Gorham told Mr. Petersen that he
had more questions, a reasonable person would not believe Mr. Petersen remained in
that vulnerable location on the side of the interstate highway of his own volition; a
reasonable person would believe that Officer Gorham was detaining Mr. Petersen in
that situation.
That determination - that a reasonable person, who is notified by a police officer,
while they are standing in a vulnerable location on the side of an interstate highway, that
the officer has more questions to ask, would not feel free to leave - is even more

20

Again, Officer Gorham offered some contradictory testimony in regard to whether the
lights remained on during the encounter, although he ultimately admitted he could not
actually remember whether the lights were on or off during the encounter. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.50, Ls.3-24.) The district court resolved that factual issue, finding, as a matter of fact,
that the emergency lights remained on throughout the encounter. (R., p.217.) As that
finding was based on substantial evidence in the record, this Court should defer to it.
See Watts, 142 Idaho at 232.
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reasonable where the police vehicle's emergency lights remain activated.

See, e.g.,

State v. Mireless, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1992). This Court has held that, in such

situations, "[f]ew, if any reasonable citizens, while parked, would simply drive away and
assume that the police, in turning on the emergency flashers, would be communicating
something other than for them to remain."

State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 487

(2009) (quoting Lawson v. State, 707 A.2d 947, 951 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998)). As
such, the fact that the officers left their vehicle's emergency lights activated throughout
their encounter with Mr. Petersen (R., p.217), further evidences that a reasonable
person in Mr. Petersen's situation would not have felt free to disregard Officer Gorham
and drive off, meaning the subsequent interrogation was not consensual.

See id.;

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; Ray, 153 Idaho at 568;
Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 487.

Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances in this case an ordinary person
would not feel free to simply disregard the officer and leave, regardless of how the
officer intended the situation to play out. Ray, 153 Idaho at 568; Willoughby, 147 Idaho
at 487; Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 651; Mireless, 133 Idaho at 692.

As such, the

conversation between the officers and Mr. Petersen, after they returned his identification
and completed the purpose of the traffic stop, was not consensual, and as a result,
Officer Gorham illegally extended the detention. Compare Gutierrez, 137 Idaho at 65053.
As a result, the only evidence that could properly be considered in assessing
whether there was probable cause to search the passenger compartment of
Mr. Petersen's car were those facts known to the officers before they illegally
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extended the duration of the stop (i.e., the supposed "criminal indicators"). Since those
facts would only give rise to a hunch (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.51, L.10 - p.52, L.4), they
did not give rise to the necessary probable cause to justify the search of the passenger
compartment under the automobile exception. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 805; Anderson,
154 Idaho at 706.

Therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's order

suppressing the evidence on this alternative theory. See Athay, 146 Idaho at 415; Curl,
125 Idaho at 227.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Petersen respectfully requests that this Court exercise its review authority in
this case. On review, he requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision to
suppress the evidence found in the passenger compartment of Mr. Petersen's car.
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014.
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